4-5 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 29, 2005) (denying employer’s movement for abstract judgment because situation of whether or not employee’s Kemetic religious wrist tattoos would disrupt work or otherwise pose an undue hardship raised a disputed factual question to be determined by jury). Eight (E.D. Wash. May 3, 2017) (holding plaintiff could proceed with retaliatory termination declare when he was fired for alleged poor performance two days after he complained to management about supervisor’s proselytizing, administration took no steps to analyze, and supervisor confronted him about complaint). 2003) (denying employer’s summary judgment motion on Lebanese Muslim substitute college teacher’s discrimination declare because an affordable jury may conclude that preconceptions about her religion and national origin triggered college officials to misinterpret her comment that she was offended however didn’t wish to “blow up”); Tolani v. Upper Southampton Twp., 158 F. Supp. 2010) (ruling that condo advanced property supervisor might proceed to trial on claim challenging termination for violating the employer’s religious shows coverage by refusing to remove a poster of flowers with the words “Remember the Lilies . See Young, 509 F.2d at 144-45 (ruling that worker was constructively discharged based mostly on her religion in violation of Title VII the place her superior suggested her that she had obligation to attend month-to-month staff meetings of their entirety and advised her that she may simply “close her ears” during religious workout routines with which conferences began).
1995) (en banc) (ruling employer didn’t set up that supervisor’s “occasional spontaneous prayers and remoted references to Christian beliefs” posed an undue hardship as a result of, although the employer asserted that the supervisor’s conduct had polarized staff alongside religious traces, it supplied no proof of “actual imposition on coworkers or disruption of the work routine”); Rightnour v. Tiffany & Co., 354 F. Supp. If the coaching required or encouraged employees to affirmatively assist or agree with conduct that conflicts with the employee’s religious beliefs, or signal their support of sure values that battle with the employee’s religious beliefs, it would be more difficult for an employer to determine that it might pose an undue hardship to accommodate an employee who objects to participating on religious grounds. An employer could accommodate the employee’s religious belief by substituting an alternate technique or method that doesn’t battle with the employee’s religious belief or by excusing the worker from that part of the coaching program that poses a battle, if doing so would not pose an undue hardship. 10 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2004) (holding that real subject of material truth existed as to whether or not courier was denied affordable accommodation where courier alleged that employer might have accommodated courier’s have to evangelize by transferring him to a position with a much less stringent gown code that may have allowed worker to proceed carrying a patch stating “Jesus is Lord”).
3d 511, 525 (S.D.N.Y. Officials in a number of Alabama counties initially stopped issuing any marriage licenses slightly than issue them to same-intercourse couples. By 2017, the number of counties doing this to avoid issuing them to similar-intercourse couples dropped to eight. ’s religious beliefs if doing so would lead to discrimination in opposition to his coworkers or deprive them of contractual or different statutory rights.”). 5 (D. Minn. Feb. 18, 2004) (discovering that an ultrasound technician whose religious beliefs required him to dissuade ladies from having abortions was offered an inexpensive accommodation when hospital restricted him from doing so however gave permission for him to be excused from performing ultrasounds on ladies it knew had been contemplating abortions); see also Grossman v. S. Shore Pub. 2004) (holding that it will have constituted undue hardship for employer to accommodate worker by eliminating parts of its diversity program to which employee raised religious objections; to do so would have “infringed upon the company’s right to promote range and encourage tolerance and good will amongst its workforce”).
1981) (holding that charity-substitute religious accommodation for union dues did not pose undue hardship to union the place loss of plaintiff’s dues represented only .02% of union’s annual budget, and union introduced no proof that the loss of receipts from plaintiff would necessitate an increase in dues of his coworkers, that other employees would seem similar accommodations, or that the accommodation would result in labor strife); see also Burns, 589 F.2d at 407 (holding that excusing worker from paying his month-to-month $19 union dues didn’t pose undue hardship, where one union officer testified that the loss “wouldn’t affect us at all” and union’s asserted fear of many religious objectors was based mostly on mere speculation, however noting that if “in the future, the expressed worry of widespread refusal to pay union dues on religious grounds ought to turn into a actuality, undue hardship might be proved”). 1976) (holding that religious perception that supporting labor union violated the precept “to love” one’s neighbor, i.e., employers, was topic to reasonable accommodation absent undue hardship). 2014) (“In addition to the activities specifically protected by the statute, courts have discovered that requesting affordable accommodation is a protected activity.”).